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SCHOLARSHIP ON SOVIET FAMILY LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE
WHITMORE GRAY*
INTRODUCTION

The radical changes in the norms of Soviet family law over the past fifty
years have reflected the convulsions of Soviet society as well as the revisions
of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. This paper is a commentary on the writing
in this field by Americans in particular, and by other non-Soviets in general.
In view of the volume of writing in this field, it has been necessary to limit
discussion in the text to a few representative articles illustrating a few of the
subject matters treated and various typical approaches employed.
The topic is a particularly timely one, for new, comprehensive Principles
of Family Law1 went into effect in October 1968, and we therefore have a
relatively recent restatement of Soviet thinking in this area. The paper will
use the elements of novelty and continuity in the Principles as a focus for a
backward look at our scholarship in this area.
In putting together this critical overview of the American literature, it
has seemed to me helpful to keep at least one eye on what our European
colleagues were doing during the same period (as well as perhaps both eyes
on what *vas being written in England, since that was fully accessible to the
English-speaking American reader). Since we suffer from our isolated common-law viewpoint in regard to family law, as in other private law areas, the
views of European scholars also provide a helpful check on the apparent
degree of deviation by the Soviets from more generally accepted patterns of
2
norms.
In evaluating the examples of writing chosen, a major criterion will be
the balance of exposition and commentary achieved therein. Certainly it seems
at first glance that we (and writers in other countries) have erred on the
side of excessive exposition and re-exposition of the basic statutory material.
Of course, this is a recurring problem in much comparative law writing, for
* A.B. Principia College 1954, J.D. University of Michigan Law School 1957.
Member of the Michigan Bar. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.'
This article is a commentary on a few selected items from a more exhaustive
annotated bibliography prepared by the author. It contains over 300 items in Western
languages on Soviet family law. The author would be glad to send a copy on request
to any interested reader.
1. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNION
REPUBLICS ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR, No. 27, July 3,
1968, Item 241, at 401 et seq. [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES].
2. A most helpful recent article in this regard is Mueller-Freienfels, The Unification
of Family Law, 16 Au J. Comp. L. 175 (1968). This masterful overview of many systems
is helpful in putting both U.S. and Soviet family law in perspective, and is richly footnoted in the international literature in the field. For other general comparative perspectives
see Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAND. L. REv. 239 (1963);

L.N.

BROWN,

COMPARISON, REFORM AND THE FAMILY

(1967).
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the person with linguistic ability and knowledge of the foreign "system" does
not always have sufficient substantive expertise in the area under consideration
to do more than report. Of necessity, he cannot have sufficient knowledge in
all fields where he may be led in the foreign law to be a sophisticated analyst
for those familiar with the subject matter at home.
He should, however, try to keep in mind the developments in his own
country in the field during this same period. Writers in any comparative law
field are likely to have the greatest impact when they are talking about what
foreign legal systems are doing in respect to identified problems in the writer's
own country. It is not only good journalism but also good comparative law
scholarship to attempt to look at foreign institutions from the perspective of
the expert reader, looking for foreign experience in connection with problems
he has identified. 3
Looking at comparative law work in general, my own feeling is that it
is appropriate that Americans working with foreign law make it their first task
to supply as much straight information as possible. Obviously they should
balance statutory provisions with information about practice to the extent
possible, and this is particularly true in the family law field, where we have
recently come to rely heavily on a wide range of factual data for teaching and
criticism.
As a practical matter, however, except for court decisions, very little
data concerning the Soviet Inion of the type needed for evaluation and
criticism has been available to us until relatively recent times.
Furthermore, the Soviets gradually came to follow an approach to legal
scholarship which resulted in a drying up of basic criticism and controversy
subsequent to the final adoption of a particular normative position. To read
a standard text of the fifties, one would not know that the leading Soviet
writers had any interesting thoughts in their heads. Their only purpose in
life appeared to be to expound and justify the law as it was. The revival of
open criticism prior to the adoption of the new Principles in the various fields,
beginning in the late fifties, shed a much more favorable light on the quality
of Soviet legal thinking, but unfortunately we still do not have the benefit of
anything like the continuing scholarly commentary we get on European legisla3. Perhaps this is an appropriate point to add an apologia for undertaking a review of
family law writing in view of my own lack of expertise in the field. We are, however,
dealing with a field which I assume most American scholars approach with less expertise
than they bring to many other areas of private law. While most all of us have had
property, contract and tort courses, probably only a few studied family law in law school,
and even fewer have had practical experience in the field. While we can take some
comfort from the fact that relatively few of the best legal minds in this country have
been attracted in the past to the family law area, this in fact makes it even more difficult
for us to find adequate text material in preparation for comparative work. This fact
should also encourage us to keep an eye on European writing in this field, for every
lawyer, teacher and student there has had the family law material as a basic part of his
initial law study, and the best civil law teachers regularly bring their broader viewpoint
to bear on family law problems.
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tion. Many of the authors who opposed particular points in proposed legislation became uncritical exponents if not proponents of the same rules upon
adoption.
These recent spurts of controversy make us nostalgic for the early years
of Soviet law, when people seemed to speak their minds with conviction, and
often eloquence. Certainly some of this must have still been in the air when
the young John Hazard went to the Soviet Union to begin his studies in 1934.
In addition to his book Settling Disputes in Soviet Society,4 which recreates
the whole period, the literature of family law is blessed with an excellent
collection of materials compiled by Rudolf Schlesinger, The Family in the
USSR,5 where he translates in extenso the debates connected with the adoption of the Family Code of 1926.6 This single selection is the most stimulating,
and at the same time the most discouraging, document I have read in relation
to work in the contemporary family law material. It demonstrates eloquently
what an interesting area family law can be, for the lively, at times earthy,
debate among legal scholars, government officials and simple citizens shows
the deep impact of family law on the traditional patterns of a society. On the
other hand, one cannot help feeling somewhat frustrated by the realization
that this kind of material is not available in connection with the intervening
legislation, and only to a limited extent in connection with the new Principles.
Perhaps we can console ourselves somewhat with the fact that a new wave of
sociological data is now becoming available to liven up work in this field.

I. THE NEW SOVIET SOCIOLOGY
Ten years ago Soviet family law was not a very exciting field of study.
There had, of course, been some dramatic changes in norms over the preceding
forty years, but neither the Soviets nor Western authors had done much to
tell us about the background for changes, nor to furnish us with information
concerning the results which they had produced in practice. In large part this
was because of a firm Soviet doctrinal position opposed to sociology as a
discipline and sociological method as employed in legal studies. In the Great
Soviet Encyclopedia edition 6f the late fifties, for example, the only "true
7
sociology" is stated to be dialectical, historical materialism.
Somewhere around that time, however, perhaps in reaction against the
"subjective" reforms of the Khrushchev de-Stalinization period, there appeared a movement aimed at finding out what actually goes on in society. The
oversimplified past view of the identity of individual and collective interests
4. J. HAZARD, SETTLING DISPUTES IN Sovmr SocIETy (1960).
5. R. SCHLESINGER, CHANGING ATTITUDES IN SOVIET RussIA: THE FAMILY IN THE

U.S.S.R. (1949).
6. CODE OF LAws ON MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY AND GUARDiAxNSHP, R.S.F.S.R. Sob.
Uza1., RSFSR, No. 82, Art. 612 (1926) (cited hereinafter as FAMILY CODE OF 1926).
7. Sotsiologiia,in 40 BOL'SHAIA SOVETSKAIA ENTSIKLOPEDIIA 202 (1957).
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began to crumble. Both academic and governmental circles allowed themselves
to become officially aware of a more complex picture of the wants and needs,
of the population, and interests quickened in collecting data of all kinds. 8
The first indication of this was a sociology seminar begun at Leningrad
in 1958, followed by the founding of the Soviet Sociological Society in 1961,
and the first publications in the field of sociology in 1962.9 Beginning in about
1964, this new interest made itself felt in the legal field. Particularly in the
fields of criminal law, labor law and family law, there arose an increased
awareness of the need to operate on the basis of data showing the problems
to be solved and the effect of prevailing legal patterns of regulation.
Perhaps this interest in sociology of law was an inevitable reaction to the
conceptualism of the Vyshinsky' ° era. Once the barriers were let down to
allow differences of opinion, i.e., once argument was permissible regarding
basic assumptions, each side began to search for supporting data instead of
simply declaring its point of view to be the truly orthodox one.11 While the
discussions of the draft criminal law and civil law codes were less than
perfect illustrations of the fully developed movement, the range of fundamental propositions which were challenged gave some indication that a new
spirit was in the air. Probably the full impact of this sociological approach
was not felt, however, until the discussions of the Principles of Family Law.
Indeed, this interest in the use of sociological data helped to account for
the long delay in their appearance, eight years after the draft Principles of
Civil Legislation were published.
The impact of sociology on family law studies has not yet been quite as
dramatic as that on the criminal law field. For example, criminology is now
taught at all law faculties, and in the doctrinal area, writers are now giving
up the simplistic formula that the cause of crime is to be found in survivals
of bourgeois mentality, and are looking at socio-economic factors in presentday society, e.g., malfunctions of the government apparatus, improper rearing
of children, and alcoholism.
As for the family, scholars have at least begun to turn their sociological
attentions to the abiding problems in the area, and the legal scholars have
8. By 1968 a Soviet author could state, "To obtain a true picture of the social
structure of socialist society it is necessary to study the difference between classes and

between social groups within the classes." G. Glezerman, The Social Structure of
Socialist Society, 1 CURRENT AnsTRAczs OF THE Sovmr PREss (CASP), No. 6, 5-6
(1968). For an early skeptical view of the chances for success of this "sociological"
revolution, see Labedz, Sociology as a Vocation, 48 Suavmr 57 (1963).
9. See generally Schultz, Der Einfluss der "marxistischen soziologie" auf das strafund familienrechtliche Schrifttmn im Ostblock, 11 RECHT IN OsT UND WEST 59 (1967).
10. See, e.g., the chapter, "Family Law," by G.M. Sverdlov, in FUNDAmENTALS OF
SovnET LAW 358-400 (P.S. Romashkin ed. 1961), and passage quoted at note 14, infra.
11. It was also no doubt spurred by work being done in East European countries,
which displays a considerable degree of sophistication. See, e.g., Mathematical Methods of
Deternining Alimony for Minors, 2 CYER rlcS AND LAw 1 (1968) [Institute of Law,

-Czech Academy of Sciences].
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necessarily been swept along. Professor Kharchev, a Leningrad philosopher,
in 1964 gave the first comprehensive look at the statistical background for
analysis of many family law problems,'? and this was just the kind of data
which the drafters of the new Principles needed. For example, he showed that
in fact of those seeking divorces, twenty per cent were already living in de
facto marriages, thus raising questions as to the "social engineering" effect of
the strict divorce laws.
A good deal of this material was made available to Western readers in
an excellent article, "Motives of Marriage in the U.S.S.R.," by Professor
Kharchev published in English in 1964.13 Both his approach and the information presented were like a breath of fresh air in the Soviet family law field.
For comparison with his approach, here is a typical passage describing
the basis of Soviet family law, taken from a 1961 text:
Marxist-Leninist teaching about marriage and the family serves as
the ideological basis of Soviet family law. An examination of Soviet
family law must therefore be prefaced by a brief summary of the

most important principles of this teaching.

The history of the development of marriage and the family is
determined by the condition and development of production relationships.... The Soviet family, as a family of new type, arises from and
then develops on a completely different socio-economic basis than does
the bourgeois family. If the essence of a bourgeois family depends on
private property, the social nature of the Soviet family is determined
in the final analysis by the socialist system of economy and by socialist
ownership of the instruments and means of production. 14
Contrast with this the opening of Professor Kharchev's article:
Of the various social institutions, the family is one of the most
complicated. The fact that family relations are so manysided makes
them depend on a great number of different social factors; such, for
example as: the ratio of male and female population in a country or
the moral standards in a community. Among these factors, however,
the main is the economic system, which has an influence on the status
and development of the family institution either directly or through
other social factors, such as: the social position of women, the standard of living, State policy and law, social ideology and psychology. 15
While Kharchev concedes the existence of an economic determinant, he
is obviously oriented toward a look at society as it exists, in the hope of understanding how it functions. Instead of continuing with theoretical considerations, he goes on to point out that the 1959 census showed that the number of
women in the USSR exceeded that of men by 20.7 million, and that "[all
that, of course, has an influence on consciousness, mind and behavior of
12. A.G. KHARIcHEv, BPAic

i SEW'YA v SSSR (1964).
13. Kharchev, Motives of Marriage in the U.S.S.R., 8 AcmA SOCIOLOGICA 142-154

(1964).

14. 2 SoVrsKoE GRAZHDANs5o

PRAVo 467-469 (P. Orlovskii ed. 1961).

15. Kharchev, supra note 13, at 142.
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people. . . . That is why the present status of marriage and family in the
USSR cannot be viewed upon [sic] as a result of the socialist reorganisation
of the economic and social structure."' 10
Kharchev's article is largely the result of a questionnaire given at the
end of 1962 to marrying couples in the Leningrad registry office, and also an
analysis of the certificates of marriage in the registry offices in the cities of
Tumen and Kefe, in the Mga district of the Leningrad region, and in the
Uzbeck Soviet Socialist Republic. He goes on to discuss the representativeness
of the sample and the technique of oral interviewing of some of the young
couples at the time of their filling in the questionnaire, sounding just like any
sociologist trying to justify the survey research method he has used. While
the author makes a number of comments to show how these data fit in with
Communist socialist theory, he provides us with a great deal of information
from which we are free to draw our own conclusions. The statistical tables
are ample, and the article is likely to be of lasting value to anyone doing work
with Soviet marriage and divorce law.
We might cite as American parallels articles like Kent Geiger's "Deprivation and Solidarity in the Soviet Urban Family,"' 7 or Richard Pipes' "The
Muslims of Soviet Central Asia,"' 8 for both contain attitudinal material
gathered in interviews. These products of refugee interviewing were particularly valuable additions to our source materials at a time when the Soviets
were not generating anything similar themselves, and the information from
this self-selected, aging sample will no doubt continue to be of interest to those
doing historical work. Fortunately the Soviets seem now to have taken up the
task of supplying ample data for analysis of current problems.
I.

THE LITERATURE IN REvimw

Before we begin our look at the writing in the field, we might first take
stock of our present very favorable position as to original source material in
translation. The most recent addition to the already considerable volume of
older work is the excellent set of materials put together by Harold Berman
in the Summer 1968 issue of Soviet Statutes and Decisions.9 Recently added
to this is the revised material in the new Hazard, Shapiro and Maggs casebook,20 so even the English-only reader has the basic statutory material and a
good selection of illustrative cases available to him. In addition, there are
scores of articles translated in Current Digest, Current Abstracts, and Soviet
Law and Government.
We should not forget, however, that this was not the case when almost
16. Id. at 143.
17. 20 Am. Soc. REv. 57 (1955).
18. 9 MIDDLE EAST J. 147 (1955).
19. 4 SovET STATUTES ANqD DEcisloNs No. 4 (1968).
20. J. HAZARD, I SHAPIRO & P. MAGGS, THE SovIET LEGAL SYSTEm (Rev. ed. 1969).
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all of the material here under consideration was written. When we find a high
level of simple exposition on the part of sophisticated writers capable of much
more penetrating analysis, we should realize that they could not assume that
the basic information could be obtained by their readers directly from translated sources. In fact, because of the disarray in Soviet legal materials, it used
to be much more difficult than it is now even to put together such an overview
of statutory provisions.
When we look at the mass of American and Western writings as a whole,
my impression is that there have been some moments of greatness, and that in
view of the manpower devoted to the task the overall results are indeed
respectable. Because of time and space limitations I had to be selective in the
material that follows both as to topics and as to representative literature.
Before proceeding to some of the particular topics, perhaps a few words
are in order about the more general publications which attempt an overview
of the whole of family law. The most impressive of the studies is certainly
the Schlesinger collection of materials and comment already mentioned. It
is really the only work of this scope in the field, and the next category is
made up of survey articles and chapters in books.
Here, the chapter in Gsovski's two-volume text on civil law21 is typical
of several. In 26 pages he summarizes the legislation up to about 1947 and
gives a fair amount of commentary on the practice as reported in official
sources. Early in my own study of Soviet law, he told me that one must
always try to compare the Soviet result with what the Russians would have
done had there been no revolution. Even though this may have been his
personal bias, it is not much in evidence here, and the account is relatively
complete and informative.2 2 The Gsovski articles in the field are based on this
work, and the chapter in his later work with Grzybowski, Government, Law
and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,23 is of lesser quantity
and quality. General articles by Hazard and Berman are discussed below in
other contexts.
We are fortunate to have available some excellent writing which gives us
perspective concerning the relationship between traditional Russian or other
indigenous family law patterns and modern Soviet law. In fact, the writing in
the family law field has given us some particularly successful examples of
what might be done in other areas of Soviet law, and so is particularly worthy
of note.
21. V. Gsovsxi, 1 SovrmT CIVIL LAW, pt. 3 (1949).

22. As is the case with other substantive writing about this period, a helpful complement is provided by John Hazard's thorough work on the functioning of the legal system
in its early years, SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY (1960). While there are only
a few family law cases discussed directly, the book is extremely helpful in portraying the
system which was applying the rules.
23. V. Gsovsicx & K. GRzvBowsKir, GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET
UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, Cl. 41, Sovietization of Civil Law, Soviet Union (1959).
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For the general history of Russian family law, the first part of Harold
Berman's general article on Soviet family law written while he was a student
at Yale Law School, "Soviet Family Law in the Light of Russian History
and Marxist Theory," remains the basic work.24 The treatment is both
imaginative and thorough.
In addition, we are fortunate to be able to turn to other sources in English
for pre-Revolutionary material. Maxime Kovalevsky's lectures at Oxford in
1889-9025 included two masterful lectures on "The Matrimonial Customs and

Usages of the Russian People" and "The State of the Modern Russian Family
at the End of the Nineteenth Century." A standard reference work is of
course Vernadsky's Medieval Russian Laws, published in 1947. This type of
scholarship was handsomely supplemented recently by the appearance in 1966
of Muscovite Judicial Texts 1488-1556, edited by H. W. Dewey, and perhaps
we can continue to hope for serious work in this field in years to come. A
different background for the study of modern Soviet law is given by two
excellent books published in Tien tsin in 1937 and 1938 by Professor
Riasanovsky, FundamentalPrinciples of Mongol Law and Customary Law of
the Nomadic Tribes of Siberia. These fascinating anthropological descriptions
of customary family law in important areas of the Soviet Union open one's
eyes to the ethnic as well as historical perspective of the work which may
someday be done in looking at Soviet family law norms and their impact on
the widest possible variety of societies to which they have been applied. Pipes'
recent article, "The Muslims of Soviet Central Asia," 26 is a much less
scholarly look at a similar topic, but does not do more than raise questions
for further work.
Another good treatment of the continuity theme is Bernice Madison's
"Russia's Illegitimate Children Before and After the Revolution." 27 Since the
problem of how to treat the illegitimate child has been one on which the
Soviets have taken almost every imaginable position at one time or another
over the last fifty years, this is a very helpful perspective to have for analysis
of the present and future norms. For example, she cites figures showing the
rate of illegitimate births during the years 1884-92, and states that the figure
was low in comparison with other countries in Western Europe.
Another recent piece demonstrates the need for perspective from related
fields of law in addition to that of historical development. William Shinn,
in "The Law of the Russian Peasant Household" 28 gives a look at the rural
family as an economic as well as social unit during the latter part of the nine24. Berman, Soviet Family Law it the Light of Russian History and Marxist
Theory, 56 YALE L.J. 26 (1946).
25. M. KOVALEVSKY, MODERN CUSTOMS AND ANcrNxT LAWS OF RussIA (1891).
26. 9 MIDDLE EAST J. 147-62, 295-308 (1955).
27. 22 SLAvWc REV. 82 (1963).
28. 20 Am. SLAV. & EAST EuROp. REv. 601 (1961).
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teenth century and into the Soviet years. Shinn's account of its near-demise,
then resurrection by the Soviets is a major contribution from original sources,

and is of course also of interest in connection with work with personal property, inheritance and land law.
The following sections take up writing dealing with selected topics in
contemporary Soviet law: marriage and divorce, matrimonial property, illegitimate children, relationship between parents and children, adoption and
abortion.
A. Marriage and Divorce
In December 1917, during the second month of the Soviet regime, civil
marriage and consent divorce were substituted for the strict religious control
which had prevailed under the Tsars. These decrees were replaced in 1918
by a Code of Laws Relating to Acts of Civil Status, Marriage, Family and
Guardianship. In 1926, the new Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and
Guardianship set forth the general principles which were to form the basis
of Soviet family law until the new Principles were adopted in June 1968, to
go into effect October 1, 1968.
Many changes occurred in the period under the 1926 Code, however.
Under the Code, civil registration of marriage was declared optional, and was
to serve simply as evidence of marriage. The requirement of registration was
restored in 1944, however, and after that date only marriages registered with
the Civil Registry Office were to be accorded recognition. After 1935, divorces,
were made more expensive to register, and in 1944 litigated divorce was
re-introduced, with the result that divorce became difficult to obtain under the
court procedures and standards prescribed. This series of changes was well
reported in articles of the period, though with only occasional insight into
results of the previous norms and the reasons for the new rules.
A fine exception is Peter Juviler's article, "Marriage and Divorce,""2
published in 1963, a model for modern writing on Soviet law. It is packed
with human interest, the flavor of academic controversy, and the sweep of
historical perspective. As he moves through divorce law from the Imperial
period to the early sixties, the reader is given an excellent view of the
attitude of the ordinary Soviet citizen toward divorce law. Excellent interview
material is used to balance the reports of formal proceedings.D For example,
a people's court judge-is reported as saying, "In my eight years as a judge, I
have had only two cases of reconciliation. Of these only one worked. The
other couple came back again in four months." 3' He gives an excellent feeling
29. Juviler, Marriage and Divorce, 48 SURVEY 104 (1963).
30. Interviewing has now become respectable. Cohen, Interviewing Chinese Ref ugees:

Indispensable Aid to Legal Research, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 33 (1967). Compare Harold Berman's justification of this "not generally recognized technique of legal scholarship" in
Soviet Law Reforn--Dateline Moscow 1957, 66 YALP L.J. 1191 rn2 (1957).
31. Juviler, supra note 29, at 107.
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for the public pressure which has been built up behind reform in the divorce
area. "Three hundred thousand divorces pass through the courts yearly. Many
thousands of others pass around them. The masses have been evading the
law; it took the writers, journalists and lawyers to articulate their problems.
Without their criticism, divorce reform might never have been considered at
this time." 32 He then goes on to summarize the various attitudes toward
possible changes, such as the introduction of unregistered marriage, or a
compromise on divorce by mutual consent in cases where there are no chil34
dren.33 He even expresses the doctrinal debates between leading theorists.
This type of article appears to me to be as original and informative as any
written by the Soviets themselves in the same period, and could well be cited
as an example of a creative input on the part of a Western scholar,3 5 no doubt
of interest to the Russians themselves.3 6
The new Principles restate much that was already familiar in this area.
As for marriage, they generally continue the prior legislation, i.e., a registered
marriage is the only normal way of forming a legal conjugal unit. Some details
are provided for in the Principles, but some latitude is also left to the new
republic codes. For example, marriage age is set at 18,37 but a lowering by
not more than two years may be provided for in the republic codes. This was
a point on which there was a distinct lack of uniformity in the old codes, and
was probably one where a single, uniform solution was not worth the battle.
It raises a question in connection with our scholarship, however, for
we can ask how well the fact of diversity, as well as particular diversities,
have been apparent in the writing in the field. This is more than an academic
question, of course, for the family law field, like inheritance, is one where
specific information is likely to be needed by the practicing lawyer. While
many writers mention the diversity, most limit their reporting to the RSFSR
provisions. Gsovski gives an almost complete resume of the provisions of 25
years ago, inaccurate only by its omissions.3 s The real problem, however, is
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id. at 111.
34. Id. at 112.
35. Though a Western scholar of a particularly American bent, we might add.

Europeans are more likely to prefer scholarly, theoretically oriented studies where the

Soviet material is noted, though of less interest. See, e.g., 0. Bausn¢, ZuM EnEScHEI(1959).
36. The Russians no doubt also had an eye on the writing coming from other East
European countries in this area. Polish studies in the divorce field have provided a good

DUNGSPROBLEM.

deal of insight, e.g., Gorecki, Recrimination in Eastern Europe: An Empirical Study of
Polish Divorce Law, 14 Am. J. Comp. L. 603 (1966). The Soviets also will benefit from
a typically thorough study of Soviet divorce law which appeared in Germany in 1967. In
445 pages of detailed text and extensive footnotes Florkowski gives a kind of treatment
to the substantive and procedural law in the field that will not likely be produced in this
country. Perhaps it will not come until (if ever) we come to have doctoral students
with legal training to turn loose on topics like this.
37. PRINCIPLEs, Art. 10.

38. V. Gsovski, supra note 21. A more detailed summary by individual republics
appears in Freund, Des Zivilproze Brecht in der Union der sozialistischen Sowjetrepublikeit, in Leske-Loewenfeld, DIE RECHTSVERFOLGUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN VERKEHR 318-

HeinOnline -- 70 Colum. L. Rev. 245 1970

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW[.

[Vol. 70,236

that this kind of exposition is not the kind of thing most people think is
interesting to write (or read!) about. Hopefully we will be blessed with another treatise-writer in the near future or will expand our supply of wellindexed, translated original source materials to fill the need for information.
As for divorce, the new Principles finally succumbed to public pressure
for easier divorce and less cumbersome procedures. I say finally, for while
new court procedures had already been introduced in 1965, the draft of the
Principles failed to make any further concessions. The final version took the
plunge, however, and consent divorce by simple registration is now available
where there are no children. Contested divorces, and those where children
raise third-party interests, remain in the courts, where the single ground for
divorce continues to be the total "breakdown" of the marriage, i.e., the court's
finding that a continuation of conjugal life is impossible.
The novelty of this unique ground was mentioned in a good deal of
writing in the past, though most of the writers neglected the opportunity to
impose a helpful analysis on the quantity of individual reported decisions that
poured out of the Soviet courts. With our present perspective, this was an
unfortunate example of failure to use domestic insights in comparative writing,
for this could have been instructive at a time when the "breakdown" theory
was gaining ground in the United States and other Western countries.8 9
B. Matrimonial Property
The problem of property rights between spouses presents a particularly
interesting area for comparative analysis of Soviet law. Not only is there a
continuing influence of Russian thinking in the field, but there is the impact
of ideology and economic realities to observe. Perhaps most difficult, there is
the long period when de facto unions commonly replaced technical marriages,
obviously significant and yet difficult to evaluate without interview or survey
data from the period.
John Hazard's contribution to the 1955 Friedmann symposium on
matrimonial property published in 1955 gives a good review of the early
years. 40 He illustrated his summary of statutory provisions with a number of
Soviet cases, letting the reader see directly the inconclusiveness of many of the
court decisions as guides to identifying firm rules of law. A 1967 article by the
late E.L. Johnson, "Matrimonial Property in Soviet Law,"'m recapitulates
the earlier material, and then gives a very thorough, scholarly treatment to
74 (1933), and a more accurate (and up-to-date) summary in A. BILINsic', DAS SowJETISCHE EHERECHT (1961).
39. A group of Anglicans, appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, urged replace-

ment of existing grounds for divorce in England with a single basis for relief-the
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY. A REPORT TO THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY (1966).
40. Matrimonial Property Law in the U.S.S.R., in MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW
(W. Friedmann ed. 1955).

41. 16

INT'I

& Comp. L.Q. 1106 (1967).
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the subject matter in more recent law. There are copious citations to primary
material in the notes, and the discussion is generally more substantial than
that in many standard Soviet texts. The article places Soviet law in the perspective of other developed systems, showing that in general the system of
acquests is in accord with much progressive thinking in Western countries.
As to one of the real difficulties which exist under such a system, however,
viz., the question of liability for debts, he points out that the Soviet legislator
has not faced the problem, 42 that the courts have ,evolved no clear practice,
and that the Soviet jurists have elaborated no generally acceptable doctrine.
The article is an excellent example of Soviet practice taken seriously by a
comparative scholar, who is willing to accept the proposition that there is in
fact "comparability" in the institutions, and that as a result constructive
insight may be obtained by a look at the Soviet system.
One might have hoped for inclusion in the Johnson article of the impact
of the other interrelated institutions, viz., the mutual obligations of support of
the spouses, and the spouses' rights to inherit each other's property. Perhaps
this more imaginative treatment is a particularly appropriate one in looking
at the Soviet materials, for the variety of permutations in each of the three
areas over the last fifty years leaves the field wide open for helpful comparative
comments.
C. The Illegitimate Child
Ever since the late fifties, Soviet civil law professors have been saying
that the question of what to do with the illegitimate child would be one of the
stumbling blocks in the formulation of new general principles in the family law
area. The prevailing norms were much criticized at home and abroad, but a
consensus on a new solution was hard to find.
Immediately following the revolution the concept of illegitimacy was
abolished, and all distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children
were erased.4 3 Blood and not marriage was to determine who had the responsibility to support and to rear a child. An unmarried mother could present to
the registry office in her place of residence a declaration showing the time of
conception and the name and place of residence of the putative father. Following this action, which had to be taken not later than three months before
birth, notice of the declaration was then sent to the person named as father,
who had two weeks to contest the mother's claim before a court. If he did not
contest it, he was held to have acknowledged paternity. Under the subsequent
1926 Code,44 the limitation on the period for the mother's filing of her
42. The Principles also failed to answer this problem, so it will be left to the
ingenuity of the individual republic drafters.
43. CODE OF LAws ON AcTs OF C=nr STATUS, MARIAGE, FAMILY AND GUARDIANSHIP

Art. 133 (Sob. Uzak., RSFSR, 1918. Nos. 76-77, Art. 818). See also note 27 supra.
44. F
m.xy CODE OF 1926, mipra note 6.
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declaration was removed, so that she could do so before or after the birth of
the child, and the father's period for contest was lengthened to one month,
with a proviso that he could challenge the court decision decreeing paternity
within a period up to a year (during which time, however, he had to continue
support).
In 1944, all this was changed. 45 While the concept of illegitimacy was
not re-introduced, the law abolished the mother's right to have paternity
established and thus the child's right to obtain support. The child no longer
got the father's surname, nor could he inherit on equal terms with children
of a registered marriage. He remained fatherless unless the father married
the mother and acknowledged paternity.
Despite this apparent ban on paternity suits, an exception was available
indirectly through Article 4246 of the RSFSR Family Code, which the courts
have recently used extensively. A right to continued support was available if
the child had at any time been a de facto dependent of the defendant, though
the defendant in such a suit was not recognized as the father and the child
did not acquire any rights except alimony.
The debate raged long and hard. When asked about the new Principles
during their drafting in 1967, a staff member of the Institute of State and Law
responded, "The division of children into two effectively unequal categories'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'-has long been obsolete. A child cannot and
should not be responsible for his parent's thoughtless or amoral actions. Nor
is there any reason to exempt parents from material responsibility for their
children." 47
When the draft appeared, it contained a compromise on this point. Paternity suits were again to be available, but only against fathers who cohabited
and maintained a common household with the mother before the child's birth,
or who participated in the rearing or support of the child after birth.48 Vigorous debate ensued, and when the final version appeared, one additional concession had in fact been made. Paternity could also be established on the basis
of other evidence which reliably established the father's own acknowledgment
of paternity.
While the provisions are hardly a model of clarity, it is at least clear that
the child of the casual union, who is subsequently rejected by the father, is
left without name or support. The question which remains is: Why? It is
because of this question that I have gone into the background of this particular
rule in some detail, for it poses an important, typical dilemma for Western
45. Law of 8 July 1944, §§ 20, 21 (Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR, No. 37(297), 16 July
1944).
46. Id.
47. On Family Law, 19 CuRazN DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS (CDSP) No. 6, 15-16
(1967).

48. PRINcrEs, Art. 16.
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scholarship, What is our function in commenting on this course of development

and the particular result? Should we be content simply to observe in passing
that this rule leaves many children in the Soviet Union in a position long since
abandoned by most enlightened Western systems ? Or should we as Krem-

linologists try to locate the power center responsible for this conservative
decision? Perhaps as sociologists we should try to determine ourselves whether
this decision does in fact reflect public opinion on this point, i.e., whether the
strong voices urging a full return to the right to prove paternity were unrepresentative of general opinion.
Certainly the last course does not really seem open to us. While we should
obtain and use a large measure of personal interview input, as was done
successfully in the Juviler article mentioned above, we are certainly in no
position to take public opinion polls. Since the pattern of non-antagonism on
the part of academics to recently-decided basic propositions seems still to be
in firm control in the Soviet Union, it also does not seem likely that Soviet
scholars will be very helpful in their criticism.
As historians, perhaps we should at least observe that this may be in
part a long-term carry-over of the especially disadvantageous position of the
illegitimate child in Tsarist times, but we are short on data to support this
conclusion regarding the causal relationship. We unfortunately lack the kind
of statement we find in the Schlesinger material regarding the 1926 Code:
"As to the question of the marrying age, quite a number of comrades have
argued that 16 is too low a marital age for girls. A considerable number of
rural delegates, too, demanded that this minimum age should be raised. This
is a matter for careful handling. Why did we choose 16? Sixteen is the
customary norm, which existed even before the Revolution. We feel that it
49
reflects reality."
Perhaps we should Kremlinologize, but I think we should do this with
a great deal of caution, realizing that we should first do more general work
with the question of the functioning legislative process in the Soviet Union
before spending an undue amount of time tracing one provision. At the very
least, however, an American writer commenting on such a result can give a
kind of Soviet historical perspective which a Soviet author might not choose
to impart. He might suggest, here, for example, that the present provision is
in some way a return to the early years, when de facto marriage was sanctioned as the basis for family relationships. In other words, as far as the
parent-child relationship is concerned, there are cases where acts will be held
even against the will of the party to speak louder than registration. In addition, registration of the marriage may be voluntarily circumvented, for this
effect can also be obtained by a joint parental declaration, including parents
49.

SCHLESINGER,

supra note 5, at 152.
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of children born before October 1, 1968. (If the children have now attained
maturity, however, such establishment of paternity is to be allowed, however,
only with their consent.)
Perhaps we should go on to speculate as to the effect of this legislation on
other areas of family law. For example, it has been said that 20 percent of the
divorced couples in the past were already living in new de facto marriages, and
a motive for divorce was that it was necessary to legitimate the children of
the new union. Probably this kind of writing is not particularly helpful,
though, and we do better to stick to the fields of exposition and analysis.
D. Other Topics
There are a number of other topics on which interesting writing has appeared, and even more which we may hope will be the subject of writing in
this area in the future.
For example, the whole area of the relationship between parents and
children has been only partially covered. John Hazard's article, "The Child
Under Soviet Law," 50 surveys the early developments on questions of support,
and suggests a number of topics for further development. The question of how
to resolve disputes between parents connected with the upbringing of children
is one which is of current interest to Soviet authors, and is likely to receive
more detailed regulation in the new republic codes, for it was avoided in the
new Principles. Mutual obligations of support, parental responsibility for
juvenile offenders, and many other questions will continue to be of interest,
particularly if the promised supply of sociological data about the family
materializes.
Detailed regulation of adoption has also been left largely to the republic
codes. Article 44 of the new Principles alone has five items referred to
republic legislation, and the other adoption articles show the same pattern.
This is a field where we can hope for some imaginative treatment of Soviet
attitudes along with Soviet legislation. For example, the Soviets seem obsessed
with the idea of secrecy of adoption, perhaps reflecting traditional attitudes
which at least in other countries are undergoing substantial change. They do
not as yet treat such contemporary topics as inter-racial adoption, or adoption
by single persons, and we can expect sociological data input to have an impact
on Soviet legal writing in this field.
Of course, this is a good example of an area in which we as lawyers are
not sure just what our role should be. Is it simply to comment on the distinctions between invalid adoptions and adoptions which have been terminated
(as a good deal of the Soviet writing does), or is to explore the relationship
between the society and the norms in force? Perhaps our own recent rethinking of the teaching of family law and the role of the lawyer in family problems
50. 5 U. Cni. L. R-v. 424-445 (1938).
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will allow us to serve as realistic (if not cynical) critics of the Soviet proposals
in this field.5 1
CONCLUSION

Taken as a whole, there is reason to be satified with the work done in
this field to date. Both American lawyers and sociologists have made creative
contributions, and the groundwork for more interesting work in the future
has been laid.
If there are only a few of the pieces of past work which will be of lasting
interest, this is simply because the writers chose journalistic exposition as
their goal and the subject matter of their writing no longer exists. For the
good of many people who have to use material in this field in a practical way,
let us hope that we do not eliminate good expository writing entirely. Let us
simply hope that it not be used as a substitute for translation, where that
would be of even more utility.
In fact, close analysis of the present round of new legislation, i.e., new
Principles and new republic codes, may give us further insight into the functioning of the legislative process today in the Soviet Union. For example, it
will be interesting to see how high a level of uniformity is maintained through
informal channels on the many points left to the republic codes for solution.
The thing we can look forward to is a chance to use the new information
about Soviet attitudes and the functioning of Soviet society in future analytical
writing in the family law field. The experience of those working on Communist
China is very relevant here, for the dearth of official normative output has
forced them to work with much soft data from the beginning. Hopefully we
will now have the best of both worlds, as the Soviets generate data for us along
with turning out ample statute and case material, and we can in addition
verify both kinds of information by personal observation and research in situ.
Perhaps the family law material can serve as a basis for work on some
general topics in Soviet law. For example, it is perhaps the time to do a
legal-method study on the creative role of the Soviet judge under present
statutory provisions and practices.
In a number of provisions the new Principles give the court (or in some
instances the Soviet executive committee) a broad discretion to formulate
rules for individual cases. For example, the extended right of support of a
spouse accorded under the new Principles 52 may be limited or eliminated by a
court, taking into consideration the circumstances of the individual cases, e.g.,
the shortness of the marriage or shortcomings in the past in the conduct
within the family on the part of the spouse asking for support. We have also
51. See, e.g., George, New Directions in Family Law Teaching, 20 J. LEG. ED. 567
(1968).
52. PR cIpLES, Art. 13.
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discussed-above the positive role of the court in divorce cases because of the
vague "breakdown" standard. It would be interesting to trace the gradual
development of this confidence over the years, for the present situation is a
sharp contrast with the early days of the regime described so well by John
Hazard in his Settling Disputes in Soviet Society. At that time, the pattern
was one of continual distrust for the decisions of judges, leading to a system
of checks through special tribunals, an appellate hierarchy, and eventually the
unfortunate possibility of interminable review of decisions which persists to
the present day.
In conclusion, I would be happy if this brief treatment of a few of the
many topics which might have been chosen has at least aroused some enthusiasm for future work in this area.
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